We study how consumers in an individual private health insurance market with frontloaded contracts respond to newly mandated portability requirements of their provisions. To foster competition between insurers, effective January 2009, German policymakers made the portability of standardized old-age provisions mandatory. Unique claims panel data from a big private insurer with 0.4 million enrollees show that the probability to cancel contracts and switch insurers did not increase substantially in post-reform years. However, restored consumer bargaining power-probably in interaction with insurer retention efforts that doubled the health plans offered-led to a strong increase in internal health plan switching.
Introduction
Very few countries in the world organize their health insurance system around private health insurance markets. Even in the US, the leading example of a largely private system, public health insurance accounts for an increasing share of overall spending. In addition, private health insurance has been increasingly regulated. For example, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits experience rating of premiums and pre-condition clauses. One major question of interest is how to regulate private insurance markets in order to foster competition between insurers, contain premium growth, and increase quality of care.
Besides the US and Chile, Germany is one of the very few industrialized countries with an entirely private health insurance market, not just a supplemental one. 1 The existence of this individual private market is due to historical reasons and allows the self-employed, civil servants, and high-income earners to irreversibly opt out of the public system and insure their entire health risks privately and individually. The German individual private market is in some respects less regulated than the US market. For example, there exists no guaranteed issue and pre-condition clauses are (still) legal. Furthermore, at the beginning of the contract period, premiums are individually underwritten and risk-rated. After the initial risk-rating and in subsequent periods-to avoid jumps in premiums due to health shocks-all premium increases are strictly community-rated at the health plan level.
One special feature of the German private market is the legal obligation of insurers to build up old-age provisions for each enrollee. The rationale behind this regulation is to incorporate a mandatory savings component in order to keep premiums stable over the life-cycle and to prevent excessively high premiums and costs for the elderly. 2 Therefore, the premiums for the young exceed their actuarially fair value, whereas they fall behind for the elderly.
Furthermore, there is no official enrollment period and enrollees remain insured until they actively decide to cancel their contracts and switch insurers. Guaranteed renewability exists and, while the insured can cancel contracts, insurers cannot cancel contracts as long as premiums are paid. This leads to a one-sided insurer commitment and insurer risk if good risks predominately lapse their contracts (Hofmann and Browne, 2013) . Until 2009, this one-sided commitment was, however, limited since old-age provisions were not transferable to competing insurers. Along with the renewed risk-rating when lapsing contracts and switching insurers, the non-portability of provisions and front-loading of plans created a substantial lock-in effect because switching insurers typically entailed considerable financial losses. Currently, the average old-age provision is around $20K per policyholder (Association of German Private Healthcare Insurers, 2014). Consequently, effective 2009, the German legislature passed a bill that mandated old-age provisions to be portable. The intention of the bill was to reduce switching costs, restore consumer confidence, and foster competition in the market.
The main purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the effects of this bill that significantly cut switching costs. We base our empirical investigation on detailed claims panel data from one of the largest German individual private health insurers. In total, we observe more than 400K individuals from 2005 to 2011. We do not only know their detailed medical history, diagnoses, and claims but also have detailed information on their plan parameters such as cost-sharing amounts and benefit generosity.
Our findings provide evidence for, at most modest, overall effects of the portability reform on the decision to lapse contracts and switch insurers. However, interestingly, the likelihood of switching health plans internally increased substantially in the first year of the reform and then fell back to initial levels. We also find that consumer choice increased substantially post-reform, and that the number of offered health plans doubled. Whereas most internal switchers downgraded their coverage pre-reform, health plan generosity remained roughly the same post-reform, but monthly premiums decreased by e 20. We explain the empirical pattern with the reform-induced increase in consumer bargaining power in interaction with insurer's retention policies. The findings illustrate that regulatory efforts to strengthen consumer sovereignty in the health care sector can lead to a substantial increase in consumer action and a re-optimization of health plan choices.
In the broadest sense, the paper relates to the large literature on the design of private health insurance markets and markets with lock-in effects and one-sided commitments (Klemperer, 1987; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Werden, 2001; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Crocker and Moran, 2003; Zauberman, 2003; Herring and Pauly, 2006; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Viard, 2007; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Handel and Hendel, 2013; Biglaiser et al., 2013; Starc, 2014; Bajari et al., 2014; Handel et al., 2015; Hack-mann et al., 2015; Einav et al., 2015) . Since the German private health insurance system is comparable to life insurance markets-well-known examples of front-loaded contracts-the paper contributes to a better understanding of the functioning of such front-loaded insurance markets and the issue of portability (Hendel and Lizzeri, 2003; Gründl et al., 2006; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Schmeiser et al., 2012; Eling and Kiesenbauer, 2014; Schmeiser et al., 2015a,b) .
The paper also naturally relates to papers studying health plan switching and switching costs (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Strombom et al., 2002; Schut and Hassink, 2002; Schut et al., 2003; Atherly et al., 2004; Abraham et al., 2006; Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005; Dijk et al., 2008; Dafny and Dranove, 2008; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Chen and Pearcy, 2010; Schram and Sonnemans, 2011; Biglaiser et al., 2013; Grunow and Nuscheler, 2014; Schmitz and Ziebarth, 2015; Boonen et al., 2015; .
In the most narrow sense, this paper exploits unique claims panel data and is the first to evaluate the 2009 portability reform. In that sense, the following papers are closest in spirit to ours since they all analyze switching behavior in the German PHI market. Using panel claims data from a German PHI insurer, Hofmann and Browne (2013) empirically test several theoretical hypotheses about enrollees' switching behavior in front-loaded contracts. Their main results are that front-loading creates a lock-in effect and that more front-loading is associated with lower lapsing rates. Hofmann and Browne (2013) do not cover the 2009 reform but discuss the reform as promising field for future research. Exploiting 2010 claims data of another German PHI insurer, Christiansen et al. (2015) empirically study determinants of lapsing and switching behavior and find that premium development and adjustment play a crucial role. Eekhoff et al. (2006) discuss the possibility of risk-adjusted, transferable old-age provisions to increase competition in the German PHI market. Finally, Baumann et al. (2008) theoretically model the life-cycle premium development in the German PHI market. Simulations show that a considerable part of the old-age provisions could be made portable between insurers without harming insurers, which was a typical pre-reform complaint by the insurance industry. Baumann et al. (2008) show that-due to the design of the old-age provision formula-the accumulated reserves rise fast enough in the early years of a contract to allow for portability of a considerable share of the old-age provisions.
The next section discusses the institutional and legal background of the German health insurance system and the 2009 reform. Section 3 introduces the dataset. Section 4 first presents 3 descriptive statistics, and then parametric regression results. Section 5 concludes.
Background
In this section we provide a general overview of the German health care system, in particular the market for private health insurance and the 2009 reform. A more detailed overview is provided in Karlsson et al. (2015) .
The German Individual Private Health Insurance Market
The health insurance market in Germany consists of two coexisting systems: Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) and Private Health Insurance (PHI). The default option is SHI coverage where 90% of of the population are insured (German Statistical Office, 2012) . The SHI premium is paid in form of a contribution rate, proportional to individuals' gross labor income. Currently the 15.5% contribution rate is split between employees and their employers. Non-working family members can be covered in the SHI family plan without extra costs. Risk rating is prohibited in the SHI, and the health plans of the not-for-profit insurers are heavily regulated.
This includes the obligation to offer essential health benefits without being able to apply deductibles or co-insurance rates (Eibich et al., 2012; .
Opting out of PHI. For historical reasons, select population sub-groups have the choice to opt out of SHI: (1) the self-employed, (2) high income earners 3 and (3) civil servants. Opting out of the SHI is essentially a lifetime decision: to avoid strategic selection, switching back to SHI is only possible for people under 55 years and if their income falls below the income threshold.
In SHI and PHI, provider networks and manged care are unknown. Hence people can freely choose their provider. In addition, in SHI and PHI, reimbursement rates are centrally determined and do not vary by insurers or health plans. In the first place, private insurers process, scrutinize, and deny claims.
One main advantage of getting full PHI is choice. Applicants can freely choose their level of coverage in terms of benefits and cost-sharing amounts. The PHI market consists 3 High income earners are defined by a gross labor income above a politically defined threshold. In 2015, it is e 54.900 p.a.
4
of 43 private insurance companies that provide full and supplemental insurance coverage. In 2013, German private insurers provided 8.9 million 'comprehensive' health insurance policies, and 23.5 million 'supplemental' policies (Association of German Private Healthcare Insurers, 2014). The supplemental policies are mostly held by SHI enrollees who top-up their SHI essential benefit package by insuring dental care, glasses, or other non-essential benefits. Henceforth, we focus on full, or 'comprehensive' plans, and abstain from supplemental private coverage.
PHI Premium Calculation.
The majority of the private insurers operate nationwide and are open to all applicants who opt out of SHI. In order to understand switching behavior between PHI comprehensive health plans, and how switching interacts with individuals' health risks, the premium calculation is crucial. When opting out of SHI and first signing a private contract, the initial PHI premium is individually underwritten and risk-rated. 4 It consists of four distinct components:
(1) The actuarial part, which depends on a comprehensive risk assessment based on age, sex, health status, and the plan chosen (benefits, cost-sharing, family vs. single plan).
(2) The old age provisions.
(3) The administrative loading factor.
(4) The old-age provision loading factor of 10%.
While the initial premium is risk-rated, all subsequent premium increases have to be community-rated at the health plan level. However, some insurers have a policy to refund typically one or two monthly premiums to policyholders with zero claims at the end of the calendar year ('Beitragsrückerstattung').
One-Sided Commitments. While guaranteed issue does not exist at inception, i.e., insurers can deny coverage to (bad) risks, insurers cannot cancel ongoing contracts and dump enrollees who experienced health shocks or consume more health care than expected. This regulation intends to avoid active cream-skimming on the insurer side. Because, after the initial screening, insurers are prohibited from canceling contracts while policyholders are free to switch to a different insurer, it is a market with a one-sided commitment.
Old-Age Provisions. One important and distinct characteristic of the market is the legal obligation of insurers to build up old-age provisions, constituting parts (2) and (4) above.
Thus premiums are heavily front-loaded over the individuals' life cycle. While young enrollees' premiums significantly exceed their actual health care spending, old enrollees' premiums are significantly lower than their actual claims. The idea is to dampen age-related increases in health care costs through old-age provisions and a capital stock. Ideally, real premiums would then remain stable over the life cycle. In 2013, the total old-age provisions amounted to e 167 billion ($184 billion) for the 8.9 million comprehensive health insurance policies, e 18,700 ($20,600) per policyholder (Association of German Private Healthcare Insurers, 2014). Component (2) above is only based on age, whereas the old-age provision loading factor (4) works as a multiplicator on the actuarial component and thus, to some extent, reflects individual risk. The front-loading of contracts induce switching costs to non-linearly increase with age.
Pre-Reform Non-Portability. Until the portability reform was implemented, old-age provisions were not portable-or, to be more specific, there was no portability mandate and insurers did not legally have to transfer them to competitors when consumers switched. However, internal portability was typically given. The non-portability essentially implied that choosing private health insurers was a life-time decision. Switching rates were very low, as was competition between private insurers. Only young and healthy individuals would even consider switching insurers, while it became less and less attractive (and also impossible) to switch insurers for older and unhealthy people due to (i) the loss of the individual capital stock, the associated (ii) age-related increase in premiums and (iii) the necessity to undergo the individual underwriting procedure again, and (iv) no guaranteed issue and the possibility to exclude pre-conditions or deny coverage.
An additional factor reinforces the lock-in effect in the German PHI and resembles the life insurance market: due to the very long average contract periods, insurance brokers receive a relatively high commission of typically six monthly insurance premiums. This would equal e 2,100 for a contract with a monthly premium of e 350. German private law stipulates that the insurer can deduct these acquisition costs from the old-age provisions during the first years of the contract via the 'Zillmer' method (Para 8, Kalkulationsverordnung). Obviously, when canceling contracts and switching insurers, these (v) acquisition costs have to be paid again.
The Reform
The legislature mandated that, effective January 1 2009, old-age provisions have to be made portable when enrollees cancel their private health plan and switch to a competitor. 5 The bill thus reduced external switching costs for the great majority of enrollees. Because, already pre-reform, switching health plans internally mostly entailed portability of provisions, in the first place, the reform reduced consumers' external switching costs.
The reform differentiated between two groups of enrollees. To be specific, old-age provisions had to be made portable as long as the contract was canceled between January 1 and June 30, 2009 (Para. 204, 2b, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG) ). 6 Our data do not identify when exactly the contract was canceled but we see when the old contract formally ended and a new coverage became effective (which is typically at the beginning of a calendar year). Thus, it is very reasonable to assume that enrollees who canceled contracts and switched insurers effective January 2010 actually canceled their contract during the six months cancelation period between January 1 and June 30, 2009.
(b) Second, for new enrollees whose coverage became effective after December 31, 2008, standardized provisions remain always portable. However, because the minimum contract period in our sample is two years 7 and we only have data until 2011, we have to disregard subgroup (b) and exclusively focus on the subgroup (a) of existing policyholders. This has the additional advantage that reform-induced selection into PHI is not a serious concern for our study.
Lastly, it is worthwhile to emphasize that-although external switching costs clearly decreased for basically all insurees in theory-due to reasons (ii) to (v) above, they remained (prohibitively) high for many enrollees in practice. Switching to another insurer still requires a new, individually underwritten, risk-rating of the premium. Insurers have the right to deny coverage or at least exclude the coverage for pre-existing conditions. In addition, in most cases, the commission fees have to be paid again and only standardized old-age provisions are portable, which are typically lower than actual old-age provisions.
Dataset
This study is based on unique claims panel data from a large German private non-group health insurer. The database includes the universe of contracts and claims between 2005 and 2011, and therefore allows for an explicit evaluation of the 2009 portability reform. In total, we observe more than 400,000 different enrollees along with detailed information on plan parameters such as benefits and cost-sharing amounts, claims and diagnoses. Validation and a detailed description of the dataset are provided in Karlsson et al. (2015) . Table 1 illustrates the number of different health plans offered by the insurer as well as the number of enrollees in these plans. Column (1) shows that the number of health plans has almost doubled from 77 to 147 between 2005 and 2011. As a comparison: In the US non-group market, which is organized at the state level around the so called 'Exchanges', on average 50.9 different plans (min. 7 and max. 169) were offered by 3.9 different insurers in the first year (Dafny et al., 2015) . Columns (4) to (11) 8 disregard enrollees with missings on their observables and only focus on actual policyholders, i.e., those who pay the premium and who most likely make switching decisions. In other words, we disregard insured family members. As seen, only 28% of all policyholders are female and the average age is 46, ranging from a minimum of 19 to a maximum of 106 years.
Second, the minimum contract period for enrollees in our sample is two years. A contract can only be canceled after this minimum contract period has elapsed. Because we are mainly interested in switching decisions, we ignore observations with contract durations of less than three years. Table A1 shows that, after conditioning on contracts of at least three years duration, the average contract period is 8.1 years but ranges up to 40 years. The variable Client since shows that current enrollees have been customers for an average of 14.1 years (max.: 85 years).
The sample selection criterion to condition on contracts of at least 3 years duration effectively means that we disregard inflows after the 2009 reform. This entails the positive side-effect of shutting down potential treatment-induced selection into PHI. As seen, the final sample consists of 1,206,286 enrollee-year observations.
Main Outcome Variables: External and Internal Switching
The main individual-level outcome measures are realized health plan switches. First, we observe (a) whether enrollees cancel their contract and switch insurers. Accordingly, we generate a binary variable External Switch. Table A1 shows that an External Switch occurs in 6.4% of all enrollee-year observations. Looking at the means by calendar years, no significant trend is identifiable.
Second, we also observe (b) whether enrollees switch within the insurer to a different health plan. Hence, we generate a second binary variable Internal Switch which is one for the 8.5% of enrollees who switched internally. Looking at the means by calendar years, this time, we observe that the switching rate triples from 4.8% to 17.3% between 2008 and 2009.
Socio-Demographics, Plan Parameters, and Claims
Socio-Demographics. As displayed in Table A1 , we know the age and gender of enrollees.
We also know their profession and the age when they first signed a contract with the current insurer. The mean age is 46 years, 72% of all policyholders are male, and 49% high-income employees, whereas 44% are self-employed.
Splitting up the covariate means by calendar year, not surprisingly, despite the inflow of new younger enrollees, the pool of enrollees ages over time. While the share of females remains stable over time, the enrollees' age increases from 44.6 in 2005 to 47.3 in 2010.
Inflation Adjustment. Health care costs are characterized by high inflation, in particular for privately insured. For this reason, all monetary variables are inflation adjusted. In order to ensure internal comparability in volumes between different years, we derived the deflator from the dataset: annual total claims per policyholder were regressed on all observable characteristics and plan parameters with a set of year dummies. These year dummies were then used to purge the monetary variables. All values are expressed in 2011 Euros.
Health Plan Parameters. We use several different health plan indicators to characterize health plans. As seen in Table A1, Policyholders' average annual deflated premium is e 4,263 ($4,900) over the entire time period, and slightly lower than the average premium for a single plan in the US group market (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) . Note that premium is the total premium paid-including the employer contribution for privately insured high-income earners (Employees in Table A1 ).
Employers cover one half of the total premium. Only the self-employed have to pay the full premium. Otherwise there are no (tax-funded) subsidies that have to be considered to obtain the full market premium. Total annual claims are, by construction, relatively stable at e 3,058 in 2011.
In terms of the benefits covered, we simplify the extremely rich data and focus on the main health plan generosity indicators provided by the insurer. These classify plans as Top, Plus, and Eco plans. As seen, about 46% of all policyholders chose the Top plan, 32% the Plus plan, and 21% the Eco plan.
Empirical Approaches and Results

First Nonparametric Evidence
Supply-Side Response. In a first step, we investigate the key supply-and demand-side outcome parameters nonparametrically and descriptively. (1)). Figure 1 visualizes the significant increase in the number of health plans around the reform date. This could possibly be interpreted as a supply-side reform effect, absent the existence of other developments that could explain a coincidence.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
However, the introduction of new plans was not associated with a decrease in the consumer concentration across plans. According to the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) in column (2) of Table 1 -the HHI takes on values between 1/N (a completely even distribution) and 1 (a consumer concentration in just one plan)-the concentration peaked in 2009 and then fell back to normal levels. Thus, the introduction of new plans did not lead to customers being spread more thinly. 9 Nevertheless, the new plans were apparently in high demand: Columns (3) to (9) of Table 1 show that 98% of the 2008 stock of enrollees had a plan which was introduced in 2005 or earlier; the corresponding number for the 2010 stock of enrollees is only 77%.
By 2011, 30% of the entire insuree pool were enrolled in health plans that had been introduced in 2009. Table A2 in the Appendix provides descriptives on plans that were introduced in 2009.
Quite naturally, on average, the new plans had younger enrollees (41.4 vs. 46.3 years). Regarding the health status of enrollees, evidence is a bit contradictory. On the one hand, the new plans' enrollees are less likely to have total claims above the median for their respective sex and age groups (15% vs. 37%). Their total claims are also significantly lower as compared to old plan enrollees' total claims (e 1,220 vs. e 2,750).
On the other hand, the enrollees in the new plans are more likely to face a premium markup as a result of health risks (48% vs. 39%). The latter difference might be due to stricter underwriting criteria. Concerning key plan parameters, it is clear that the newly chosen plans are, on average, less generous than the old ones: the share of ECO plans is more than twice as high as among the new plans (73% vs. 34%). Also deductibles are slightly higher (e 691 vs. e 637). Hence, the monthly premiums in the new plans are lower than in the old plans (e 286 vs. e 334). Because the claims are significantly lower (e 102 vs. e 229 per month), the difference between claims and premiums (here labeled 'markup') is higher for the new plans. to pre-reform levels. The observation of a potentially strong reform-induced increase in in-ternal rather than external switching rates may appear surprising at first sight, given that the reform intended to increase insurer competition by primarily decreasing external switching costs.
Characterizing Switchers and Stayers. Next, we investigate how the socio-demographics of external and internal switchers differ from those of non-switchers. More importantly, we check whether different types of policyholders switched in post as compared to pre-reform years. Table 2 provides descriptives along with p values of a t-test on whether the means differ pre vs. post-reform. Post-reform, internal switchers are significantly younger, more likely to be male, and less likely to be in a 'top plan'. However, the statistical difference of these characteristics is mainly attributable to the large sample size (e.g. 46.3 year pre vs. 46.2 years post-reform). Focusing on differences of at least ten percent of the mean, one finds significant changes in the sex, the employment type, and the premiums of enrollees who switched internally. As for external switchers, in post-reform years they are more likely to have lower coverage plans (more 'eco' and less 'top') and hence lower premiums. However, these differences over time are also existent in the overall composition of the majority of non-switchers.
Thus they likely mirror general underlying trends and not necessarily a change in the selection into switching. We will analyze this issue in a more rigorous manner below.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Discussion of First Nonparametric Evidence. The observed developments make a lot of sense when considering the institutional framework and typical company-customer interactions. First of all, while external switching costs substantially decreased in the course of the reform, they clearly remained high for some population subgroups like the unhealthly and old-as a result of the new risk rating and potential pre-condition clauses when switching insurers (and the absence of guaranteed issue). In addition, the reform made reserves portable but only to a standardized degree, which effectively means that most policyholders still lose money when switching to a competitor (see Section 2).
Given Figure 2a , consumers do not seem to have effectively switched insurers at substantially higher rates as a result of the reform. However, this does not imply the absence of any reform effect as visualized by Figure 2b . Switching plans internally is a lot easier than switching to a different insurer. In addition, policyholders effectively do not lose any money when 13 switching internally rather than externally. Obviously, the number of health plans offered by this particular insurer-very likely in response to the reform-almost doubled to around 150 health plans in the post-reform period. Simultaneously, internal switching rates doubled from a pre-reform 6-8% to 17% in 2009 (before falling back to initial levels). 10 Putting these empirical and institutional pieces of knowledge together, it seems very likely that retention efforts by the insurer led to the strong increase in health plan choice which induced enrollees to switch internally (at lower costs) rather than externally. However, the reform-induced reduction in external switching costs appears to be the trigger for these internal switches because the reform unambiguously increased consumers' bargaining power and outside options.
Regression Analysis
It appears that the reform triggered supply-and demand-side responses. Both effects are of interest, but it is empirically challenging to disentangle them. We now present our empirical strategy which has been designed to capture demand-and supply-side responses to the reform.
Before-After Approach and Assumptions
This study is based on unique claims panel data from a big German private insurer. While these data have great advantages, they do not easily lead to a natural control group. Identifying causal reform effects absent a control group requires one additional assumption: namely the absence of significant changes in the outcome variable in post-reform years absent a reform. Whenever this assumption is fulfilled, the estimation would capture the combined demand-and supply-side impact of the reform.
Depending on the outcome variable of interest and the pre-reform trends, this may be a very strong or a weaker assumption. In our case, Figures 1 and 2 make us confident that the assumption is rather weak. Despite some minor trending, the pre-reform developments of our main variables of interest are surprisingly smooth and stable. A priori there is no reason to believe that, without the portability reform, the switching rates wouldn't have continued to be smooth and stable. In addition, we are able to condition all our estimates on a very rich set of covariates, which further adds credibility to the identifying assumptions.
A Second Approach with Control Groups
However, to base our empirical analysis on broader pillars, we enrich our main before-after (BA) framework with a control group and a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. This enables us to compare individuals who were exposed to the same supply-side expansion but who experienced differential improvements in their bargaining power vis-a-vis the insurer. The control group is derived from the institutional framework. As discussed, despite a decrease in external switching costs for all privately insured, external switching remained cumbersome also after the reform. External switching implies a new health check-up and individually underwritten, risk-rated, premiums with the possibilities to entirely deny coverage or at least deny coverage for certain pre-conditions. Figure 3 plots the development of the external switching rate, but differentiates by contract duration and age of the policyholder. Contracts characterized as 'short' have been in effect for more than two years (given the minimum contract period of two years) and at most seven years, which corresponds to the median contract duration. The second line in Figure 3a corresponds to the lapsing rate for 'long' contracts with a duration of more than seven years. It is easy to infer from Figure 3a that shorter contracts are more likely to be lapsed: The probability of leaving the company lies consistently at around 8% for short contracts and is twice as high as for long contracts. A similar picture emerges when differentiating by older and younger enrollees: In general, younger enrollees are about twice as likely to lapse contracts and switch to a different insurer. Around the reform date in 2009, we observe moderate but identifiable increases in the external switching probabilities for short contracts and young policyholders, but no changes for long contracts and old policyholders.
What is most important in our context is that there is literally no trend in the lapsing rates for older policyholders and longer contracts. In particular, one does not observe any systematic change in external switching rates around the reform date in 2009, which lets us 15 conclude that these subgroups of policyholders are reasonable control groups: they exhibit similar switching behavior and similar trends before the reform, but the reform leads to a smaller reduction of their switching costs. This setting thus naturally leads to a DiD framework with variable treatment intensity.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
As discussed, there is evidence for supply-side responses to the reform: The number of available health plans doubled exactly at the same time of the reform, and many customers have made use of the extended choice set-not only the young and healthy with the largest increase in bargaining power (see Figure 1 ). This supply-side response has implications for the interpretation of empirical reduced-form findings. It may be argued that the BA analysis captures the equilibrium effects of demand-and supply-side responses, whereas our DiD approach isolates the demand-side effects-because it is based on a comparison of two groups that were exposed to exactly the same supply-side response. Whereas the supply-side effect of the reform was identical for both groups (the new health plans were offered to all enrollees), the reform decreased switching costs relatively more for the young and healthy, and had no impact on external switching rates for the old and sick (Figure 3 ). In summary, the almost non-existent pre-reform trends in the main outcome variables as witnessed by Figure 2 make us confident that a traditional BA framework identifies equilibrium reform effects that are at least highly suggestive. Still, we warrant caution when interpreting the effects and are well aware of the additional assumption required. In addition, we enrich the main framework with DiD models using older policyholders as control group: This approach can isolate the effect of an improved bargaining position at the individual level, while disregarding the concurrent aggregate supply-side changes which affected all policyholders. As discussed, the institutional framework leads to much smaller reductions in switching costs for the control group. Figure 3 supports the common time trend assumption and shows no trending for the control group.
Consequently, we define a control group based on the age of the policyholder. 11 Policyholders below the age of 45 are identified by the treatment group indicator D ≡ 1 (age i < 45).
This group indicator is then used in a standard DiD framework:
11 Varying the age cut-off leads to robust results.
where T i is the post-reform indicator and X i is the set of observables displayed in Table A1, i.e., socio-demographics and health plan parameters. 12 τ represents the parameter of interest.
Under the common time trend assumption-in the absence of the reform, the lapse rates of the two groups would exhibit parallel trends-this model is identified. ρ p is a set of 147 health plan fixed effects, ψ t a set of calendar year fixed effects, and χ r represents 96 region fixed effects based on the first two zip code digits. Standard errors i are routinely clustered at the health plan level. The models are linear probability models but robust to probit models and calculating marginal effects.
Main Parametric Results
Table 3 presents a main set of parametric estimates using the traditional BA framework which assumes zero trending in the control group. The first three columns use External Switch as outcome variable and the last three columns use Internal Switch as outcome variable. For both outcomes, we increase the number of control variables from one specification to the next, and left to right. The top panel is a regression based on year dummies for individual years, whereas the bottom part summarizes the post-reform change in one parameter like in equation (1).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As seen, the regression results do not deliver much evidence that making accrued reserves portable has led to a significantly higher share of policyholders canceling contracts and switching externally. Column (1), just controlling for health plan and year fixed effects, yields a significantly negative effect of 1.74 percentage points (ppt), relative to a baseline of 8.2%.
The effect shrinks to 0.95ppt when adding demographic controls (column (2)) and entirely vanishes when adding more controls in column (3). The non-significant estimate in column (3) is just a tiny 0.06ppt, or 0.7% of the mean.
However, in line with Figure 2 , columns (3) to (6) provide strong evidence that the reform induced more internal switches-and this effect is robust and significant in statistical and economic terms. Accordingly, the reform induced an increase in the internal switching rate by 6.5ppt and thus more than doubled the baseline probability to switch from 5.6%. This average post-reform effect is entirely driven by the increase in the internal switching rate by 11.4ppt in 2009.
What is particularly noteworthy is the robustness of the estimated coefficient which barely increases or decreases once we include sets of enrollee level and health plan level covariates. This suggests that health plan level and socio-demographic adjusters are not significantly correlated with the strong increase in switching rates from 2008 to 2009. This observation is reassuring because it implies, for example, that changes in the enrollee or health plan composition do not significantly alter our estimates.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Next, we turn to the DiD framework. Table 4 shows the results in six columns. Again, we find that the estimate for external switches is small and not robust. The first two model specifications yield tiny and non-significant coefficients, whereas the most saturated model in the last column yields a small but significant effect of 0.63ppt (or about 8% of the mean). This represents basically the parametric, sample-adjusted, equivalent to Figure 3b . Using shortterm contracts as controls as suggested by Figure 3a yields very similar results.
As witnessed by columns (4) to (6), in contrast, the parameter estimate for internal switches is large and significant. Our estimates suggest that, within the treatment group as compared to the control group, the reform coincided with an increase in the propensity to switch internally of around 2ppt or 35%. The estimates are consistent in sign and in significance with the corresponding BA estimates in Table 3 . However, here the treatment group of younger policyholders is compared to older policyholders who were also partly affected by the reform, namely by the insurer's supply-side reaction and the doubling of health plans. We exploit this unique setting to disentangle supply from demand-side effects for internal switches which is typically extremely challenging in reduced-form models.
Whereas there is no evidence that older people (with permanently high external switching costs) lapsed their contracts at higher rates post-reform (Figure 3) , they profited from the in-crease in (internal) health plans offered, despite their lower bargaining power. Indeed, while the magnitude of the internal switching effect shrinks in Table 4 as compared to the BA general equilibrium estimate in Table 3 , the estimate is still of relative large size and statistically significant (2ppt or 35%). We interpret this estimate as the increase in the internal switching rate that is purely driven by the increased bargaining power of the young and healthy (as compared to the old and sick), net of supply-side effects (health plan choice). In this sense, columns (4) to (6) suggest that the 2009 increase in internal switches was driven by both, a supply-side effect that doubled health plan choice as well as a demand-side effect that cut switching costs and increased consumer bargaining power, particularly for the young and healthy. According to our estimates, the increase in choice explains 2/3 of the total internal switching effect, and the increase in consumer bargaining power 1/3.
What Changes Through an Internal Switch?
This paper finds evidence of more internal health plan switches as a result of strengthened consumer bargaining power and health plan choice. Thanks to our claims panel data, we observe internal switchers and their chosen health plans before and after a switch. Hence, as a next step, we analyze how switchers' health plan parameters and health care utilization change as they move from one contract to another. Table 5 presents the results of this exercise. Again, in each of the columns from left to right, we add more control variables to the models. Each panel represents models with different health plan parameters as outcome variables. We consider the type of plan (eco/plus/top) as well the deductible, premium, and claims. All outcomes are measured in year t + 1 (in the year after a switch, if one occurred). The regressor Internal Switch informs us about the changes in health plan parameters in pre-reform years, and the interaction term Internal Switch ×Postreform informs us about incremental changes in health plan parameters in post-reform years.
Starting with pre-reform health plan changes associated with internal switches, a very clear pattern emerges: Internal switches were typically downgrades. A typical pre-reform switch was associated with a reduced probability in choosing the most generous 'top plan' category by 22ppt or more than 50% (Panel A, Table 5 ). This finding is consistent with in Table 2 where individuals in 'top' plans are overrepresented among internal switchers. There is more evidence that pre-reform switches resulted in less generous plans. The annual deductible increased on average by e 150 and monthly premiums decreased by about e 50 (Panel C and D, Table 5 ). Interestingly, monthly claims decreased by almost the same amount as monthly premiums, by e 50 (Panel E, Table 5 ). Note that the estimates are again relatively robust to including region and individual fixed effects as well individual-level time-variant covariates, such as whether previous claims were above the median, whether pre-existing condition clauses existed, or whether individuals are employees or self-employed.
[Insert Table 5 about here] Next, the interaction term contrasts the post-reform to the pre-reform internal switches.
Again, a clear picture emerges: Whereas internal switches represent significant downgrades pre-reform, post-reform switches are much more modest in terms of systematic changes in health plan characteristics. Obviously, consumers mostly re-opimized choices, but not in a systematic manner.
More specifically, post-reform, the likelihood to choose the most generous 'top plan' category is significantly reduced by 13ppt as compared to pre-reform (but overall still a negative -10ppt). Similarly, the likelihood to choose a higher deductible is significantly lower postreform; the deductible now remains very stable when enrollees switch plans (Panel C, Table   5 ). Premiums still decrease by an average of e 243 per year (or e 20 per month) but significantly less than pre-reform (Panel D, Table 5 ).
Effect Heterogeneity in Internal Switches
Lastly, we analyze internal switching heterogeneity. We would like to know: Who is driving the strong increase in internal switches? To empirically investigate this question, we again use Internal Switch as dependent variable and run our standard models. However, we split the sample by the stratifying variable we are interested in and estimate the same model as in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 . Table 6 shows the results where each of the three columns only differ by the sets of covariates included, as in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 . The labeling of the panels indicate on which subsample the models condition.
[Insert Table 6 about here] First, all estimates are remarkably robust to the inclusion of additional sets of covariates.
Second, in terms of health plan characteristics, we find that enrollees in 'eco plans' and with short contract durations were almost twice as likely to switch to a different plan (as compared to 'top plans' and longer contract holders) in post-reform years. However, also longer contract and 'top plan' holders switched internally at significantly higher rates. Longer contract holders' internal switching probability increased by 65% and top plan holder's internal switching probability increased by 50%, whereas short contract holders' internal switching rates increased by 140% and eco plan holders' internal switching rates even increased fivefold.
Third, males switched at significantly higher rates than females (+125% vs. +80%), and enrollees with below median claims (presumably healthier enrollees) at higher rates than enrollees with above median claims (130% vs. 95%). That healthier enrollees switched more often is not surprising because their new outside option to switch externally represents a credible threat to the insurer. However, it is interesting to observe that even relatively unhealthy enrollees switched at higher rates internally post-reform. This serves as an explanation of why post-reform claims were higher as compared to pre-reform claims after enrollees switched plans (see Panel E of 5): Pre-reform, predominately healthy employees were in the position to actually switch and downgrade the generosity (and premiums) of their health plans. Post-reform, by contrast, the pool of internal switchers became worse due to more unhealthy enrollees deciding to switch internally and re-optimizing plans. 13 Thus, the reform that primarily strengthened the consumer bargaining power of the young and healthy triggered important positive spillover effects for the old and sick who could now choose from twice as many health plans and re-optimize internally.
As a last point, we would like to remind the reader that the identification of the effects here is based on the assumption of no significant changes in post-reform years had the reform not been implemented. Figure 2b supports this assumption given the small fluctuations in prereform years. However, we still have to be careful when interpreting the effect heterogeneity findings. In our reading, there is strong suggestive evidence that the internal switching rates 13 Note that the health expenditure distribution has a long right tail and that the 10% highest spenders consume 53% of all health care (?). It very likely that also very sick enrollees switched at higher rates post-reform.
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increased substantially and significantly for all subgroups of policyholders as a result of the reform. This is a fascinating and relevant finding in itself. In addition, we find evidence that the switching rates for males and healthier enrollees as well as eco plans and more recent clients were particularly high. However, given the assumptions required for a causal interpretation of the identified effects, the latter statement naturally involves more statistical uncertainty.
Conclusion
Using panel claims data from a large German non-group private health insurer, this study is the first to empirically evaluate a regulatory reform that mandated the portability of oldage provisions. The German individual private health insurance market is characterized by a front-loading of premiums over the life-cycle-in form of a legal obligation of insurers to build up old-age provisions. The idea behind the insurer mandate is to include a mandatory savings component that dampens the premium growth when enrollees become older. However, combined with the experience rating of new applicants when switching insurers, it creates a strong lock-in effect and rather dampens competition between insurers. Making old-age provision portable was a regulatory attempt to reduce switching costs and to strengthen consumers' market position, thereby fostering competition which may eventually lead to lower premiums and more consumer choice.
We do not find much evidence that the newly mandated portability led to a substantial increase in contract cancelations and switches to competitors. However, we do find evidence for a significant and substantial increase in (a) the number of health plans offered by the insurer as well as (b) internal health plans switches. Interestingly, it seems like the regulatory reform induced positive spillover effects even for relatively old and unhealthy policyholders with high external switching costs. Although actual external switching rates did not increase significantly, we find that all enrollee subgroups-even the relatively old and unhealthy-took advantage of the new health plan choice opportunities and switched health plans internally at significantly higher rates. Our empirical evidence suggests that both the supply and demandside contributed significantly to the consumers' re-optimization of their plan choice. Overall, the findings demonstrate that health care consumers do make active use of their increased sovereignty when policymakers enable them. The table shows regression results from linear probability models. The sample excludes contracts with less than three year contract period since the minimum contract period is two years. Demographic controls are dummies for sex and calendar age. Additional controls include the professional group, years since joining the company, whether claims in the previous year were above the median, risk rating and a dummy indicating whether pre-existing conditions limit the service package. The 96 region fixed effects are based on the first two digits of the client's zip code. The standard errors are clustered at the plan level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 The table shows regression results from linear probability models. The sample excludes contracts with less than three year contract period since the minimum contract period is two years. Demographic controls are dummies for sex and calendar age. Additional controls include the professional group, years since joining the company, whether claims in the previous year were above the median, risk rating and a dummy indicating whether pre-existing conditions limit the service package. The 96 region fixed effects are based on the first two digits of the client's zip code. The standard errors are clustered at the plan level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 Demographic controls are dummies for sex and calendar age. Additional controls include the professional group, years since joining the company, whether claims in the previous year were above the median, risk rating and a dummy indicating whether pre-existing conditions limit the service package. The regression always use the full sample, do not condition on contracts with less than three years. The number of person-year observations in all regressions is 1,661,561. The 96 region fixed effects are based on the first two digits of the client's zip code. The standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 The table shows regression results from linear probability models. The sample excludes contracts with less than three year contract period since the minimum contract period is two years. Demographic controls are dummies for sex and calendar age. Additional controls include the professional group, years since joining the company, whether claims in the previous year were above the median, risk rating and a dummy indicating whether pre-existing conditions limit the service package. Panel A to H include the following number of observations: 557,602; 259,003; 657,176; 549,110; 658,945; 547,341; 866,147; 340,139 . The 96 region fixed effects are based on the first two digits of the client's zip code. The standard errors are clustered at the plan level. The R 2 of all models lies between 0.01 and 0.05; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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